Israeli Civilians?

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These children were attacked by ILLEGAL setters who tried to burn them alive by pouring petrol on them. This is NEVER reported in the media and most of the settlers are NOT prosecuted for their crimes.This is only a very SMALL selection of pictures.. There are MANY more showing attrocities these ILLEGAL Squatters are getting away with & do often!


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Who is the terrorist? Posters for today - Ki a terrorista? 2 Poszter mára

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Ki a terrorista?
Zsidó-palesztin háború - ki kezdte?
(Számok, tények)

Ki kezdte? Ki lőtt először? Ki követte el az első terrorista támadásokat? Nézzük a tényeket:

1937. márc. 17., Jaffa: Első ízben robban bomba egy kávéházban Palesztinában. Az elkövetők: cionisták.

1937. aug. 20 - szept. 26.: Első ízben robbannak bombák buszokon Palesztinában. Az elkövetők: cionisták.

1938. július 6., Haifa: Első ízben robban bomba piactéren Palesztinában. Az elkövetők: cionisták.

1946. július 22., Jeruzsálem: Első ízben robban bomba szállodákban. Az elkövetők cionisták.

1946. október 1., Róma: Első ízben követnek el bombamerényletet egy követség ellen a palesztinai konfliktusban szemben álló felek. /A brit követség a célpont./ Az elkövetők: cionisták.

1946. október 31., Petah Tikvah: Első ízben robbantanak mentőautót /!/ Palesztinában. Az elkövetők: cionisták.

1947. június: Első ízben küldenek levélbombát /a brit intézmények címére./ Az elkövetők: cionisták.

Forrás: The Arab Women's Information Committee and The Institute for Palestine Studies, Who Are the Terrorists? Aspects of Zionist and Israeli Terrorism, (Beirut: Insitute for Palestine Studies, 1972).

668 palesztin meghalt, 3100megsebesült a 12 napja tartó mészárlás során... Ki a terrorista?

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SEE WHO THE REAL TERRORISTS ARE!

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Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: From Maoism to Narco-Terrorism

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Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 23

December 8, 2008

Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Latin America, Featured, Home Page

By: Frank Hyland
One of the most brutal and destructive terrorist groups worldwide since its emergence in 1980—Peru’s “Shining Path” (Sendero Luminoso - SL) —continues to carry out attacks on Peruvian military, police, and civilian targets in 2008. Almost ten years after the group splintered during a “no-holds barred” offensive by Peruvian security forces, government officials and citizens alike express concern that a return to the past, when almost 70,000 Peruvians and others died, may be in the offing (see Terrorism Focus, September 11, 2007).

After joining the rolls of the worldwide Leftist-Communist revolutionary movement in 1980, SL proceeded to conduct a campaign against not only the government of Peru, but all elements of Peruvian society in general. An outgrowth of the pre-existing Communist Party of Peru, SL’s oft-stated objective was the total reordering of Peruvian society along the lines of the People’s Republic of China under Mao Tse Tung.
What should be a primary source of concern to a number of neighboring nations, including an incoming U.S. administration, is that SL’s apparent resurgence may be viewed fairly as an integral part of a burgeoning wave of leftist ideology in Latin America. Other nations such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, as well as sub-state groups such as Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC) constitute potential allies in SL’s renewed campaign. Peruvian prosecutors are currently involved in seeking a 20-year sentence for the former leader of the Peruvian chapter of the Continental Bolivarian Committee (CCB), which took its inspiration from the “Bolivarian” socialism of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez (IPS, November 27). Even at present, SL’s geographical reach and the military force it commands make it a competing and increasingly threatening “state within a state” in Peru.
From Maoism to Narco-Terrorism
Concern over an SL comeback is well founded. In the period of time since the end of SL’s last, larger and more widespread terrorist campaign in 1999, the group has added another “weapon” of sorts to its already formidable arsenal: abundant revenues derived from the trafficking of cocaine. In neighboring Colombia, FARC has also been nurtured handsomely by the trafficking of cocaine. FARC, a self-professed Marxist-Leninist group, has grown since its birth in the 1960s from a guerrilla band into a multi-billion-dollar international enterprise, with perhaps as many as 18,000 guerrillas under its command. Initially, FARC, like the Shining Path, was treated as merely another of the numerous Latin American guerrilla groups extant at the time. Now, of course, FARC maintains a presence in perhaps as much as 20 percent of Colombia and, although estimates vary, generates annual revenues estimated at over a quarter of a billion dollars as a result of having reinvented itself through its criminal activities. Unless contested vigorously and successfully by the Government of Peru, the geography and climate of Peru, very favorable for the growing of coca plants, holds promise for the same kind of growth of SL military power.

The Shining Path leadership has been under constant pressure from Peru’s security services over the last year. A leader from the top tier of SL, Epifanio Espiritu Acosta (alias JL), was killed by Peruvian authorities on November 27, 2007, during an operation in which eight other SL guerrillas were captured (LivingInPeru.com, March 19).

Following that incident, Peruvian officials announced on March 18 (LivingInPeru.com, March 19) that Felix Mejia Asencio (a.k.a. Comrade Mono), another of the top leaders of SL, was captured. Asencio headed one of the two SL columns, the Comite Regional del Huallaga (CRH), and was closely associated with “Comrade Artemio” (Filomeno Cerrón), the current leader of the SL insurgency. Comrade Artemio is the sole top-level SL leader who has not yet been killed or captured.

Peruvian security forces have been on the offensive against the Shining Path since last August, focusing their activities on the jungle-covered VRAE (Valley of the Rivers Apurimac and Ene) region, a prime coca producing region close to the original home of the Shining Path movement.
Sendero Luminoso Strikes Back
Though government sources have estimated only 150 SL fighters remain in the bush, this small force still continues to mount deadly attacks on Peruvian security forces. In what was described by Peruvian Government sources as the bloodiest SL attack in ten years, Shining Path guerrillas killed approximately 14 Peruvian soldiers and perhaps as many as seven civilians in a carefully planned ambush of a counter-terrorism patrol in Peru’s Huancavelica province on October 9 (AFP, October 10). The Shining Path announced the attack was intended to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Peruvian Communist Party (EFE, November 19).

Ominously, an October 22 report stated that SL members had stolen dynamite from the mining camp of the US-based firm Doe Run, likely presaging the form of future attacks by SL in the area. Indicative of the isolated character of the area and the nature of SL’s existing and planned activities, the guerrillas also took medical supplies, food and radios (Reuters, October 22).

November marked yet another upsurge in SL attacks. On November 12, two Peruvian soldiers were wounded when gunmen believed to be SL fighters targeted a helicopter responding to an earlier attack that wounded two other Peruvian soldiers (Latin American Herald Tribune, November 15). Another ambush in the Huallaga Valley on November 27 killed five police officers, including two members of the Special Operations unit. At least 40 guerrillas using hand grenades, shotguns and automatic weapons were involved in the attack (Peruvian Times, November 28). The ambush was remarkably similar to one carried out in nearly the same place in 2005 by 30 guerrillas under the command of “Comrade Artemio.” The latest attack came days after a sweep of the Huallaga Valley by security agents of the “Huallaga Front” failed to locate the SL commander but did find correspondence indicating Artemio was in touch with imprisoned SL leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. Besides Artemio’s personal belongings, security forces recovered explosives, detonators and green military uniforms bearing the hammer and sickle (Elcomercio.com.pe, November 17; EFE, November 17). Over 60 people have been killed in ambushes on roads in the region since 2001, with the annual rate on the increase (Con Nuestro Peru, November 29).

Reflecting the group’s long-term ambitions, the Shining Path is reported by Peruvian Police sources to have been planning attacks in Peru’s capital, Lima, during the recently concluded summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting. The APEC Summit meeting, in what must have been a very inviting terrorist target, brought together the heads of state of 21 nations, including U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. Actual SL documents captured from one of the group’s camps, and reportedly authored by Shining Path leader “Artemio,” characterized the APEC Summit meeting as being attractive to the group because of the media coverage that an attack would garner (Peru.com, November 18).
Conclusion
It is the Peruvian peasantry that finds itself caught in the middle of the conflict between guerrillas and responding police and military units (ipsnews.net, November 6). There are concerns in the Peruvian government that many of these people may begin evacuating the Huallaga region to avoid a resurgence of the brutal warfare that characterized the area in the 1980s and 1990s, when more than 70,000 Peruvians were killed. President Alberto Fujimori’s “dirty war” effectively destroyed the SL, leaving only several hundred fighters left in the bush. Despite a widespread impression the movement was finished, the Shining Path’s transformation into a group providing security for narcotics traffickers while pursuing its goal of a Maoist state seems to have refueled the conflict.

What should concern the Government of Peru, its neighbors, and the United States most is that Colombia’s FARC traveled a very similar path to its present position of being a state within a state because it was not opposed in its nascent phase. Like the FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso has and will continue to have the money to fund its revolutionary aims in Peru through involvement in narcotics production.

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Files:

TM_006_023.pdf

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Reassessing the Transnational Terrorism-Criminal Link in South America's Tri-Border Area

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By Benedetta Berti
The international terrorist presence in Latin America is concentrated in several "hotspots" where terrorist organizations have found financial and logistic support, as well as a supporting base. Among these areas are Venezuela and its Margarita Island, Trinidad and Tobago, the Iquique area in Chile, and the Tri-Border Area (TBA, or Triple Frontera) in South America.

The TBA, which includes the Brazilian city of Foz de Iguazú, the Argentinean Puerto Iguazú, and Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, has served in the past twenty years as an operational and logistic center for international terrorist groups, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, as well as transnational criminal organizations. This area has a population of approximately 700,000 people; including roughly 30,000 inhabitants of Arab descent. The Arab community, which constitutes one of the largest immigrant groups in the region, is predominantly Lebanese, especially in Ciudad del Este and Foz de Iguazú. The local Lebanese population is largely Shia. [1]

The Triple Frontera is one of the most important commercial centers of South America, with approximately 20 thousand people transiting on a daily basis from the neighboring states to the free-trade area of Ciudad del Este in Paraguay. The intense volume of people and goods entering the TBA, together with its porous borders, are two important factors that originally attracted criminal and armed groups to this area. Additionally, the relative ease with which money is locally laundered and transferred to and from regions overseas constitutes a very powerful incentive to maintain a base of operations in the TBA. Therefore, transnational criminal groups such as the Mexican and Colombian drug cartels, Chinese and Russian mafias, and the Japanese Yakuza all appear to have a strongly rooted presence in this South American region. Within the TBA, the epicenter of organized crime is Ciudad del Este - an important hub of drug and human trafficking, and the smuggling of goods, weapons, contraband and counterfeit products. [2]

According to Brazilian intelligence sources, financial and ideological support of international terrorist groups in the TBA dates as far back as the early 1980s [3], and continued to grow during the following decades. By the end of the 1990s the TBA was described by U.S. authorities as the "main focus of Islamic extremism in Latin America" (U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000). Despite often contradictory reports and official denials by the countries involved regarding the extent and nature of international terrorist activities taking place in the TBA in the aftermath of 9/11, both the U.S. Department of Treasury and the U.S Southern Command continued to indicate that the TBA remained one of the main terrorism-financing centers in Latin America. The same sources added that local cells in this area have been regularly involved in illicit activities and have kept close contact with criminal organizations, especially drug cartels (AFP-Spanish, October 11, 2003; March 3, 2004).

In March 2008, the Israeli Minister for Internal Security, Avi Dichter, reiterated the concern over international terrorist cells operating in the TBA, a fear echoed by the conservative Spanish Foundation for Social Research and Analysis (FAES) [4] –
which described the TBA as "a crucial center of Islamic terrorism financing, as well as of smuggling of weapons and contraband" (Los Andes Online [Mendoza], March 17; El Tiempo Ve [Puerto La Cruz], August 9).
The Triple Frontier as a Source of Terrorist Financing

Despite these claims, it remains difficult to assess the TBA's current role in terrorism financing. It is similarly difficult to estimate the precise amount of money actually transferred to terrorist groups. It is often a complex task to separate contributions to terrorism from simple remittances, as it is equally complex to differentiate between money laundered on behalf of criminal organizations or money destined for terrorist groups. For example, between 2003 and 2006, Manhattan district attorney Robert Morgenthau traced billions of dollars channeled through New York City banks from money-laundering operations in the TBA, and although the attorney was convinced that some of this money was channeled toward terrorists, by the end of the investigation Morgenthau was compelled to admit he could not tie any of the $19 billion in laundered money directly to terrorists (Diario El Pais [Montevideo], April 4, 2006; New York Times, September 28, 2006).

A significant part of the money transfers in this area is done through informal value transfer systems, such at the hawala system. Since these money transfers take place outside the conventional banking system, they are consequently harder to identify and trace. [5]

Nevertheless, there is still some relevant data regarding the volume of the monetary transfers that are made from this region to international terrorist organizations, showing the existence of a connection between the TBA and the funding of international terrorism. In the context of releasing the 2006 and 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the US Department of State affirmed that money is laundered and channeled toward the financing of terror in this South American region on a yearly basis, [6] adding that the level of these monetary transfers is conspicuous, being in the order of tens of millions (La Nación [Buenos Aires], March 1 2008). A 2005 intelligence report from Paraguay claimed that roughly 20 million dollars are collected in the triple frontier region each year to finance the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas (ANSA Noticiero En Español, July 18, 2005).

The Hezbollah Connection

Hezbollah's presence in the TBA dates back to the 1980s, when the organization first established logistical and financial cells in the region, taking advantage of the extensive network of immigrants of Lebanese origin residing in the area. [7]
Later, Hezbollah operatives in the TBA increased their activities and became operational in the 1990s. In fact, it is believed that part of the planning and executing of the 1990s terrorist attacks in Argentina took place in the TBA. For example, at the beginning of the investigations for the March 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires it was reported that the late Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyah entered Argentina through the TBA in 1992 to oversee the execution of the attack, using this area as a safe heaven. [8]

According to Paraguayan intelligence sources, over 46 Hezbollah operatives lived in the TBA until the year 2000, including Alí Khalil Mehri, the regional fundraiser for Hezbollah (CNN, November 7, 2001). Mehri, a resident of the TBA of Lebanese origin, was arrested in Ciudad del Este in 2001 and accused of selling fake software to finance terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. Mehri fled before he could be tried (ABC Digital, March 11, 2007).

Among the most significant discoveries regarding the Hezbollah network in the TBA and its strong connection with local criminal activities was the uncovering of the "Barakat Clan" – an inter-related group of Lebanese residents of the TBA involved in both criminal activities and terrorism-financing. The clan revolved around the financial operations of Assad Ahmad Barakat, co-owner of one the largest shopping centers in Ciudad del Este, the Galeria Page Mall, used as a front to finance Hezbollah and recruit supporters for the organization (AFP-Spanish, March 9, 2006). In raiding Barakat's apartment, the police found Hezbollah material and propaganda, including tapes praising martyrdom operations and speeches of Hezbollah Secretary Hassan Nasrallah (Clarin [Buenos Aires], December 9, 2007).

The U.S. Department of the Treasury later identified Ahmad Barakat as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in June 2004 (La Gaceta Tucumán [Argentina], December 7, 2006; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, JS1720, June 10, 2004). Nine other individuals and two enterprises were added to the list in 2006. One individual designated as a SDGT was Muhammad Yusif Abdallah, a regional Hezbollah leader and Barakat's partner at the Galeria Page Mall. Abdallah was heavily involved in Hezbollah fundraising, and he gave the group a percentage of the profits deriving from the shopping mall (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, December 6, 2006).

The Barakat Clan also included Ali Muhammad Kazan (who helped raise over $500,000), Farouk Omairi and his son Khaled Omairi. Farouk and Khaled Omairi were accused of involvement in narco-trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism financing (AZ Central.com, July 12 2006; La Nacion, August 25, 2007) Additionally, in May 2003 Paraguayan police arrested Lebanese merchant Hassan Abdallah Dayoub while in possession of 2.3 kilos of cocaine. Investigations later revealed that Dayoub, a cousin of Ahmad Barakat, was in charge of the "wing of narco-traffickers" of the Barakat Clan, [9] further proving the terror-criminal nexus behind Hezbollah's fundraising operations in the TBA (Diario ABC Digital, May 12, 2003; March 12, 2007).

Although no major terrorist cells operating in the TBA have been found since the Barakat clan case, there are still reports of Islamic radicals residing in the area. In 2007, Lebanese businessman Kassen Hijazi, a resident of Ciudad del Este and owner of the Telefax Company, came under scrutiny for suspect money transfers to shadowy enterprises in Beirut, running an international money-laundering scheme and operating a Hezbollah financial front (AFP-Spanish, March 4, 2007; BBC-Spanish, December 15, 2007). [10] Finally, in August 2008 news sources reported that the United States was looking for a group of ten Lebanese citizens resident in the TBA who were suspected of being connected with international Islamic terrorist groups (ABC Color, August 5). The suspects were given Paraguayan visas in Lebanon (UPI Reporte LatAm, August 5).

Other Terrorist Groups Active in the Triple Frontier

Reports have also emerged of an al-Qaeda, Hamas and Gama’at al-Islamiya presence in the area. [11] The al-Qaeda connection with the TBA was, however, much stronger before the 9/11 attacks. For instance, in 1995 al-Qaeda leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad spent twenty days in Brazil visiting alleged al-Qaeda sympathizers in Foz (Epoca-O'Globo [Rio de Janeiro], 2006; Estado de São Paulo; March 9, 2003; Washington Post, March 18, 2003). In 1996 the Brazilian Federal Police discovered that Lebanese explosives expert Marwan Al Safadi, who participated in the 1993 World Trade Center attack in New York City, also resided in the TBA in the 1990s (Epoca-O'Globo [Rio de Janeiro], 2006). In 1999, the Argentinean Office of the State Intelligence Secretary (Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado - SIDE) reported the presence of al-Qaeda operatives in the Triple Frontera, stating that dormant cells were involved in financing and recruitment for terrorist groups, making as well the unusual claim that they were at the same time cooperating with local Shia groups (Clarin, September 16, 2001).

After 9/11 numerous police operations took place in the area, identifying al-Gama’at al-Islamiya suspects like Egyptian citizen Al-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman, who was detained on April 15, 2002, in Foz. Egypt requested Soliman's extradition in 2002, accusing him of being involved in the 1997 Luxor terrorist attacks; however, the Brazilian Supreme Court rejected the petition (O Estado de São Paulo, April 16, 2002). [12] Other suspects included Lebanese native Ali Nizar Darhoug, along with his nephew Muhammad Daoud Yassine, both accused of raising approximately 10 million dollars for al-Qaeda and Hamas. Following their arrest, Yassine was able to flee the country due to Paraguay's lack of specific legislation on terrorism financing, while his uncle was held on tax-evasion charges (ANSA Noticiero En español, July 18, 2005; O Estado de São Paulo, April 16, 2002).

Conclusion

In sum, although reports regarding al-Qaeda activities in the area are tenuous, the later episodes referring to ongoing Hezbollah operations show that in the aftermath of 9/11 the extent and nature of Hezbollah activities in the area has diminished considerably due to increased law enforcement efforts. However, logistical operations and fundraising are still taking place in the triple frontier. It remains possible that individuals involved in support activities might become operational if ordered to do so. In this sense, the ongoing cooperation between the tri-border countries and the United States has been crucial in keeping illicit activities under tight control in the area, while the push for changes at the legislative level to better regulate terrorism-financing and money laundering-related crimes can also contribute to increasing the effectiveness of law-enforcement operations in the area.

Notes:

1. Mariano César Bartolomé, Elsa Llenderrozas, “La Triple Frontera desde la Perspectiva Argentina: Principal Foco Terrorista en el Cono Sur Americano” [The Tri-Border Area From the Argentinean Perspective: Main Terrorist Hotspot in the Southern Hemisphere], Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, REDES 2002.

2. Rex Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, July 2003.

3. Mariano César Bartolomé, Elsa Llenderrozas, p. 8.

4. Foundation for Social Research and Analysis; http://www.fundacionfaes.net

5. Benedetta Berti, “Assessing The Role Of The Hawala System, Its Role In Financing Terrorism, And Devising A Normative Regulatory Framework,” MIT International Review, Spring 2008.

6. Anne W Patterson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Release of the 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” On-the-Record Briefing, March 1, 2006

7. Rex Hudson.

8. Carlos Fayt, “Criminalidad del Terrorismo Sagrado. El Atentado a la Embajada de Israel en Argentina,” La Plata, Argentina: Editorial Universitaria de La Plata, 2001.

9. Rex Hudson, p. 30.

10. Testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, United States Southern Command, Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, "Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization budget request," March 9, 2005.

11. Rex Hudson.

12. Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, “Ext 836 / EG – EGITO-EXTRADIÇÃO,” October 24, 2002.
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Rózsa-Flores Eduardo: Nos, ha terrorizmus, akkor terrorizmus

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Bombák robbannak békés isztambuli negyedekben, Indiában…
Háborús búnőkkel vádolják a külföldi érdekeket kiszolgáló (USA, „izrael”) lázadók ellen háborút vivő Szudáni elnököt (Darfur alatt óriási kőolaj lelőhelyek találhatók!)…hogy itt hol a terror?: a hágai nemzetközi törvényszék ezzel a döntésével erősíti a lázadókban –akik nem átállották mindenféle merényleteket is elkövetni a múltban- azt a nem téves képzetet, hogy a nemzetközi közösség mögöttük áll.
Az ICC, (International Criminal Court), azaz a nemzetközi törvényszéket az ENSZ BT határozata alapján állították fel, BT melynek állandó tagjai az USA, Oroszország és Kína is. Ennek a három országnak természetesen esze ágában sem volt ratifikálni a nemzetközi egyezményt és így kivonták magukat a nemzetközi jog (mára egyértelműen eufemizmus!) eme új eszközének a hatásköre alól. Nyilvánvaló, hogy ez kérdésessé teszi az egész ítélethozó -büntető intézményt, és annak legitimitását.
Miért szántam ekkora terjedelmet a bekezdésben az ICC-nek? Mert szimptomatikusnak tartom, ahogyan a New World Order korában kezelik általában a nemzetközi jogot, illetve, ahogyan ezt a „jogot” arra használják fel –innentől a jog megszűnik jognak lenni!-, hogy szűk vagy tágabb csoport érdekeket szolgáljon ki. Ugyanakkor, egyes intézkedésekkel, döntésekkel, a parciálitás látszatát (?) keltve gerjesztik azt, ami ellen elvileg harcolni kellene, amit ki kellene iktatni a nemzetközi és helyi politika eszköztárából: a Terrort.
Mert –és bármennyire visszatetsző és nekem különösen fájó kiírni- milyen alapon ítélkeznek majd a rác demens pszichiáter-költő párafenomén Radovan Karadzics ellen?, mikor a „nemzetközi jog” letéteményesei hasonló módszerekkel és eszközökkel élnek, határaikon belül (Kína Tibetben és kelet-Turkesztánban, az oroszok Csecsenföldön, stb.) és határaikon kívül (USA Afganisztánban, Irakban…)
Ennek az egész mai rövid bejegyzésemnek egy apropója van: a felháborodásom, és mert tiltakozni kívánok az ellen, hogy a magyar zászlót, seggnyaló kollaboráns politikusok áldatlan tevékenysége folytán -a szervilis ellenzék háthatós közreműködésével-, bemocskoljak, s minket, a magyarságot, bűnrészesévé tesznek atrocitások és gyilkosságokban, a terrorban, melyet nap mint nap két nemzet ellen (Irak, Afganisztán) követnek el illetve viseltetnek.

Mert a terror az terror függetlenül attól kik követik el a cselekményt és minek a nevében. Mert a kurd terroristák Isztambulban a "szabadság" és "függetlenség" nevében gyilkolnak, ahogyan az amerikaiak és más nyugati hatalmak katonai, a „demokrácia” és a „béke” jegyében teszik ugyanazt Irakban és Afganisztánban.

A hír:

The killing of 78 Afghan civilian by US occupation forces probed: More than half of those killed in the three recent U.S.-led airstrikes -- which occurred in a three-week span in three provinces in eastern and western Afghanistan -- were women and children, according to Afghan and Western officials. 78 have died in three separate incidents this month alone, officials say

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/

Az elmúlt három hét folyamán Afganisztánt lerohanó, lassan a szovjet megszállást módszereiben megszégyenítő, „felszabadító” yenki hadak 78 asszonyt és gyermeket gyilkoltak meg "véletlenül". Persze nagy bátran jó magasan a levegőből!!
Előzetesen egy esküvői "terrorista eseményen" 50 embert gyilkoltak meg - szintén "véletlenül" és „tévedésből”.
Ha valaki azt hinné, hogy ezért bárkit felelősségre vonnának - téved. Szépen szőnyeg alá söpörnek mindent miközben a külvilág felé ezt úgy szokás lekommunikálni, hogy „invesztigálnak” azaz vizsgálatot folytatnak.

Felháborító, hogy a fenti tömeggyilkosságok lassan mindennapos eseménnyé válnak a világ teljes érdektelensége közepette.

Ezek a barbár gyilkosok merészelnek ugatni a rablógyilkosok, erőszákolók és más degeneráltak iráni "barbár" kivégzése ellen!!!
Hol van a kétszínű szenteskedésnek határa??

Azonnal ki kell vonni a maradék magyar honvédséget Afganisztánból. Nem vállalhatunk bűnrészességet ezekben a szörnyűségekben. Semmi közünk sem az amerikai, sem más hyper-hatalom mocskos játékához.

Itthon áradás van.
Szükség van minden katonára a gátaknál!

Rekonstrukció
a Kurtlar vadisi (Farkasok völgye) c. filmből

Az un. collateral damage (járulékos veszteség)
Csupán néhány esetről...
Irák
http://www.wtop.com/?nid=105&sid=1447688
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/06/30/iraq.main/index.html
Afganisztán
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4315724.ece
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080706/ap_on_re_as/afghan_violence
http://www.newser.com/story/32651.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jul/26/military.afghanistan1
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/jul2007/afgh-j10.shtml
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/20/iraq.rorymccarthy
http://index.hu/politika/kulhirek/359613

We do not kill civilians, we do not violate international law, and we are on the verge of victory in Vietnam!!
Mi nem gyilkolunk civileket, mi nem szegjük meg a nemzetközi jogot, és a győzelem előtt vagyunk Vietnamban!
My Lai, Vietnam, 1967

We do not kill civilians, we do not violate international law, and we are on the verge of "victory in Afghanistan and in Iraq"!!
Mi nem gyilkolunk civileket, mi nem szegjük meg a nemzetközi jogot, és a győzelem előtt vagyunk Afganisztánban és Irakban
Somewhere, Afghanistan, 2008

Köszönettel M. Éva néninek az indító gondolataiért!

Társ blog: http://www.thewe.cc/weplanet/asia/afghanistan/afghanistan.html

Szolidáritás a PKK terror ellen küdő Törökországgal!

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Adalék "izrael állam" létrejöttének történetéhez...

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Ma terrorista vagy, holnap szabadságharcos, később miniszterelnök. Megéri
Augusztus 6-án a Mullock’s aukciós cég , Shropshire - Anglia, árverésén kalapács alá kerül egy 1947-ben, Haifában (Palesztina) terjesztett pamflet, melynek címe: "Quit Palestine or die!" - Hagyják el Palesztinát vagy haljanak meg!. A címzettek, az un. "megszálló hadsereg" katonái, azaz a brit hadsereg.
A pamflet nem üres fenyegetőzéseket tartalmazott: nem sokkal terjesztése után az Irgun zsidó terroristái Jeruzsalemben fölrobbantották a King David Hotel-t (Dávid Király Hotel), amely abban az időben a Palesztinai Brit Hadsereg Vezérkárának adott otthont- a merényletben 91 ember halt meg: brit tisztek, katonák, és civilek, köztük nem egy zsidó aki a briteknek dolgozott...
Az Irgun vezetője az a Menachem Begin volt, aki később a zsidó állam miniszterelnöke is lett.
A hír nagyon sok következtetés levonását teszi lehetővé.
Csak egy párat:
1. Ma terrorista vagy, holnap szabadságharcos, később miniszterelnök. Megéri.
2. A megszállók ellen minden eszköz bevetése megengedett. Az eredmény: (aki mer az nyer!), azaz: Dicsőség!
3. Ha azok, akik olyan módszereket alkalmazták, mint Begin Irgunja, ma terroristának és fasisztának bélyegzik azokat kik hazájuk függetlenségéért küzdenek, vagy adott esetben féltik szabadságukat és nemzeteik túlélését, ez, nem több mint visszatetsző...nevetséges?
4. De, a legfontosabb: ha belekezdünk, bármibe is, csak győzni lehet. Más nincs. Az alternatíva az ellenség győzelme. De akkor jaj nekünk.





Jewish guerrillas told British: quit Palestine or die
Fighters were led by future Israeli premier

by Marcus Leroux

A pamphlet warning Britons to leave the Middle East or face death has come to light in a stash of illicit propaganda.

The document does not hail from Basra or Baghdad, nor was it penned by the Islamists of al-Qaeda or the al-Mahdi Army. It was found in Haifa, about 60 years ago, and it was issued by the underground group led by Menachem Begin – the future Prime Minister of Israel and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Menachem Begin
a fő terrorista, gyilkos
(Irgun)

The document, which surfaced at an auction house this week, is addressed to “the soldiers of the occupation army” and aimed at British soldiers serving in Palestine, then under the British Mandate, preceding the establishment of Israel in 1948. The print has faded and the paper has discoloured since it was unearthed from a grove of trees in Haifa in the summer of 1947. Yet the language and the concerns remain current.

Bombings and murders by underground groups, such as Begin’s Irgun, hastened the British withdrawal and the United Nations declaration that led to the founding of modern Israel.

Irgun propaganda targeted the British Army’s wavering morale, already dented by the bomb attack on the Mandate’s headquarters – the King David Hotel in Jerusalem – which killed 91 people.

In the document, Irgun tells British troops: “It is unavoidable that many Jewish soldiers and many British soldiers should fall. And it is only fair that these people know at least why they may be killed.”

It adds: “Most of you have been in this country for quite a long time. You have learned what the word ‘terrorist’ means, some of you may even have come into direct contact with them (and heartily desire not to repeat the experience). But what do you know about them? Why does a young man go underground?”

It then draws a parallel with what would have happened if, seven years earlier, Britain had been overrun by Nazi Germany. “Remember 1940. Then it seemed quite possible that your island country would be conquered and subjugated by Hitler hordes . . . what would you have done? Would you have gone underground?” The pamphlet says that the occupation is “illegal and immoral” and “parallel to the mass assassination of a whole people”, in language that echoes that used on a note pinned to the booby-trapped bodies of two British intelligence officers executed by Irgun that same summer.

The pamphlet came from a stash confiscated and burnt by cyptographers from the Royal Signals regiment. Corporal Raymond Smith found them buried in a secluded grove marked by a white Star of David and was ordered to destroy them, but took one as a memento. A collector acquired the document from Corporal Smith, and brought it to Mullock’s auctioneers in Shropshire.

Avraham Stern,
az egyik gyilkos zsidó különítmény (Stern-csoport) alapítója

Richard Westwood-Brookes, Mullock’s historical documents specialist, said the pamphlet was a remarkable find, which “ amounted to a manifesto for terrorist action”. He added: “It also raises the question as to who are ‘terrorists’ and who are ‘freedom fighters’. It’s a debate which raged through the troubles of Northern Ireland and continues in the Middle East.”

Begin’s Irgun set aside its differences with Haganah, a rival underground Jewish group led by David Ben Gurion – the first Prime Minister of Israel, who once likened Begin to Adolf Hitler.

Begin forged a political career as a hardliner, but, after becoming Prime Minister, signed the Camp David agreement with Egypt in 1979.

The pamphlet, which is expected to fetch about £500, goes on sale at Mullock’s, in Shropshire, on August 6.

Kapcsolódó anyag:
Zsidó terrorcsoportok áldozataira emlékezünk

Fontos elemzés a török-kurd-iraki helyzetről.

Terrorista szervezet-e a marxista gyökerű Kurd Munkáspárt (PKK)?

Törökország álláspontja kibékíthetetlen Massoud Barzani a Kurd Regionális Kormány elnökének (a bagdadi -amerikai bábkormány- kormányzó tanács tagja közvetlenül az imperialista invázió után, majd volt feje) álláspontjával aki nem hajlandó terrorista szervezetnek nyilvánítani a PKK-t. Mi a helyzet a Török Hadsereg terrorista-ellenes intenzív hadműveleteinek tavalyi elindítása utan?
Turkey and Iraqi Kurds Agree to Disagree on PKK’s Terrorist Status

In an interview with Italian newspaper Il Tempo, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani stated that “the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] is not a terrorist organization.” Barzani also added that “if the PKK rejects Turkey’s commitment to hold talks with it, the PKK can be then considered as terrorist” (Il Tempo, June 21).

Peyamner, the official media organ of Barzani’s political party (the Kurdistan Democratic Party—KDP), did not report on his statements, although the other main Iraqi Kurdish political party (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—PUK) did post a story containing the interview (PUKMedia, June 22). Naturally, Turkish media immediately picked up on Barzani’s statement (Hurriyet, June 23; Today’s Zaman, June 24; Milliyet, June 24).

This was not the first time that KRG President Barzani refused to characterize the PKK as a terrorist group. As recently as October 2007, Turkish newspapers reported on an interview Barzani gave to CNN in which he made almost identical statements, emphasizing that he did not see the PKK as a terrorist organization, but “if in order to solve the [Kurdish] problem Turkey proposed a peaceful path and the PKK rejected this, then I would agree that the PKK is a terrorist organization. At the moment, however, this is not the case” (Radikal, October 22, 2007).

Universally agreed upon definitions of “terrorist” remain elusive. Officials from Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Jamestown that in their view, a non-state actor challenging a state’s monopoly on the use of force is a terrorist organization (Author’s interview, May 21). The label of “terrorist group” also remains important for Ankara’s attempts to deny any legitimacy to the PKK and its stated goals of Kurdish autonomy and minority rights. Turkish officials use the terrorist label to rule out the possibility of any negotiations or discourse between Ankara and the PKK, since governments cannot be expected to negotiate with terrorists. Barzani’s view that the PKK should not be viewed as a terrorist organization because of its willingness to peacefully negotiate a solution with Ankara thus appears lost on Turkish officials, given their refusal to recognize much less negotiate with terrorists. Turkey’s willingness to meet with officials of groups such as Hamas and the Kosovo Liberation Army appears to contradict its stance on the PKK, however, or at least force Ankara to engage in a number of rhetorical gyrations to justify the apparent double standard.

For Iraqi Kurds, labeling the PKK a terrorist organization would be akin to Arab governments designating Hizbullah, Hamas or the PLO as terrorists. In the same way that Arab states such as Jordan harbor little affinity for Hizbullah, Hamas or the various groups that make up the PLO, the Kurdistan Regional Government tends to view the PKK negatively. Popular sympathy for the PKK’s “national liberation struggle,” however, discourages Iraqi Kurdish leaders from using the terrorist label or taking military action against the PKK. If the PKK were to begin challenging Iraqi Kurdish political parties for control of Iraqi Kurdistan, as it did briefly in the early 1990s, one could expect harsher rhetoric from the KRG and even a return to the fighting that occurred between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK in the 1990s.

The parallel for such a scenario might be King Hussein’s September 1970 military campaign against Palestinian groups in Jordan, when these groups progressed from raids on Israel to threatening to overthrow the Jordanian government. Even after the events of “Black September,” however, Jordan’s leaders would not label Palestinian groups terrorists. The Jordanian government did nonetheless manage, after 1970, to prevent Palestinian guerrillas from using Jordanian territory to launch attacks against Israel, which in turn put an end to punishing Israeli counterattacks on Jordanian territory. Should Iraqi Kurds wish to see an end to Turkish incursions into KRG territory, they will have to either contain the PKK better or mediate an end to the conflict between the PKK and Ankara.

For its part, the PKK has tried to shed its terrorist image and designation. The PKK claims to engage in a legitimate right of “armed struggle.” PKK leaders also insist that their goals do not involve carving a separate Kurdish state from eastern Turkey and that they are open to a negotiated peace to achieve “Kurdish rights and democracy.” Although the PKK targeted many civilians in the 1980s and 1990s, mostly “village guards” and their families—armed by Ankara to fight the PKK—as well as Turkish civil servants, PKK officials claim to have eschewed such a policy in recent years (Author’s interview, Qandil, April 2004). In contrast to groups such as Hamas, which glorify suicide bombings against civilian targets, the PKK today denies targeting civilians (BBC News, October 27, 2007). In January 2008 PKK military commander Bahoz Erdal (a.k.a. Fehman Hussein) unequivocally stated: “We are not fighting without cause, but are defending our national values, and we show sensitivity—especially when it comes to civilians. We have never harmed civilians intentionally, and we will not do so in the future” (elaph.com, January 31). The PKK thus claims that its attacks are limited to the armed forces of the Turkish state and national infrastructure such as power plants.

Their denials notwithstanding, possible PKK front groups have claimed responsibility for a number of recent bombings and civilian deaths in Turkey. Commander Erdal, for instance, recently warned tourists to avoid Turkey: “Turkey is not safe for tourists, and we advise them to stay away from it. Extremist Kurdish organizations like the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) have targeted tourists in the past, and continue to threaten them in Turkey [today]. We cannot predict what will happen in the future...” (elaph.com, January 31). A very logical PKK strategy would include harming Turkey’s tourism industry and the income it generates. Other bombings such as the January 3 bomb blast in Diyarbakir—in which five people, including three children, were killed—lacked any claim of responsibility, but Ankara blamed the PKK. In any case, the PKK remains on not only Turkey’s list of terrorist organizations, but that of the United States and the European Union as well.

Officials in Ankara feel that Iraqi Kurds have not done nearly enough against the PKK and Barzani’s refusal to categorize the organization as “terrorist” only strengthens this view. His recent statements clearly do not endear Barzani to the Turkish establishment and public. At the same time, Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish relations have and will continue to weather such statements. Although Ankara tends to judge its friends and enemies according to their stance on issues like the PKK, Armenian genocide resolutions, and the Cyprus dispute, Turkey nonetheless maintains working relationships with many states in spite of disagreements over these questions. One exception to this tendency occurred in 1998, when Turkey moved thousands of troops to the Syrian border and threatened war if Syria continued to allow PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan sanctuary in Damascus and Lebanon. In this case, however, it was clear that Ocalan resided in Damascus with permission and assistance from Syria’s top leadership, which enjoys tight control of the entire country. Syria promptly expelled Ocalan, and Syrian-Turkish relations have steadily improved since then.

In the case of mountainous Iraqi Kurdistan, as long as Barzani’s KRG refrains from providing obvious assistance or sanctuary to the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and Ankara can continue to do business. While Iraqi Kurdish military action to expel the PKK from its mountain bases would do wonders for relations with Turkey, the hope of smoother ties with Ankara appears insufficient to convince KRG leaders to make such a risky and unpopular policy choice. Hence the current status quo of tense but otherwise profitable and acceptable relations between Ankara and the KRG seems likely to continue.

David Romano is an assistant professor of International Studies at Rhodes College.

A képek a Török Hadsereg Vezérkárának web-sitejaból valók
Hasznos linkek:
http://pkkterrorism.com/
http://pkk.ataturk.org/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers_Party

Islam and violence - slideshow

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Al Nakba - 60 éve történt a deir yassini vérengzés

Zsidó terrorcsoportok áldozataira emlékezünk

Egészen pontosan 60 esztendeje, 1948. április 9-én, a kora reggeli órákban a Menachem Begin vezetése alatt álló Irgun zsidó fegyveres csoport, továbbá a Jitzhak Samir vezette Stern Gang elnevezésű zsidó terrorszervezet megtámadta Deir Yassin palesztin települést. A faluban 750 ember lakott.

Az akció annál is inkább váratlan volt, mivel Der Yassin kívül esett az 1947-es ENSZ határozat nyomán Izrael részére juttatott terület határain. A falu lakói békés palesztin földművesek voltak.

Hozzávetőleg 250 asszony, férfi és gyermek esett áldozatul az esztelen vérengzésnek. Sokakat megkínoztak és megerőszakoltak. Természetesen nem csak Deir Yassinban történtek kegyetlenkedések. Izrael állam megalapítása idején, 1947/48-ban, több ezer palesztint mészároltak le, és 700-800 ezren kényszerültek elhagyni lakóhelyüket. Ez volt a palesztinok számára az Al-Nakba - vagyis a katasztrófa. Maguk a menekültek, illetve utódaik - számuk immár közel 5 millió - a mai napig nem térhettek vissza otthonaikba.

A deir yassini vérengzések tetteseit soha nem büntették meg. Sőt, az öldöklést végrehajtó két izraeli terrorcsoport vezére, Begin és Sharon, tetteik jutalmául a miniszterelnöki székbe is beleülhettek. A palesztin nép elleni kegyetlenkedések pedig tovább folytatódnak. A konfliktusnak nem látni a végét. Ezen a vészterhes napon kötelességünk emlékezni és emlékeztetni az áldozatokra!

P.O.

Avraham Stern

Menachem Begin, a fő terrorista zsidó gyilkos

Forrás

Kik a terroristák? Who are the terrorists? Quienes son los terroristas?

Los "ponchos rojos" del cocalero Evo Morales

A koka-király Evo Morales "vörös -naná!- poncho-i"
The "red -of course!- ponchos" of the coca-king Evo Morales

Caras - Faces - Arcok


Prontos para masacrar - Ready for killing - Készen a gyilkolásra


El ejército "boliviano: indios en armas
The "bolivian army"..."indians" with guns
A "bolíviai hadsereg: "indiánok" fegyverben

no comment

Las armas de la "democracia"
With guns for "democracy"
A "demokrácia" fegyverei

"poncho rojo" kiképzésben

Cara - Face - Arc

Terroristas indios con su bandera
Indian terrorists with their flag
Indián terroristák zászlójukkal

Indios barbaros degollan perros
Barbarian indians cut the troath of dogs
Barbár indiánok kutyák torkát vágják

Entonces: quienes son los terroristas en Bolivia?
So: who are the terrorists in Bolivia?
Akkor, tehát: kik a terroristák Bolíviában?

Los ponchos rojos celebran el triunfo electoral
del macaco mayor con una tradicional danza folklórica
The "red ponchos" celebrate the Government's
electoral victory with a classic folk dance.
A "vörös ponchok" Morales választási gyözelmét ünneplik
egy klasszikus néptánccal